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INFORMATION AND THE CHANGE IN THE PARADIGM IN ECONOMICS,
PART 1
by Joseph E. Stiglitz*
The research for which George Akerlof, Mike Spence, and I are being recognized is part of a larger
research program which, today, embraces hundred, perhaps thousands, of researchers around the world.
In this lecture, I want to set the particular work which was sited within this broader agenda, and that
agenda within the broader perspective of the history of economic thought. I hope to show that Informa-
tion Economics represents a fundamental change in the prevailing paradigm within economics. Prob-
lems of information are central to understanding not only market economics but also political economy,
and in the last section of this lecture, I explore some of the implications of information imperfections
for political processes.
INTRODUCTION
Many years ago Keynes wrote:
The ideas of economists and political philoso-
phers, both when they are right and when they
are wrong, are more powerful than is com-
monly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled
by little else. Practical men, who believe
themselves quite exempt from any intellectu-
al influences, are usually the slaves of some
defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who
hear voices in the air, are distilling their fren-
zy from some academic scribbler of a few
years back. Keynes [1936].
Information economics has already had a pro-
found effect on how we think about economic poli-
cy, and is likely to have an even greater influence in
the future. The world is, of course, more complicat-
ed than our simple-or even our more complicated
models-would suggest. Many of the major politi-
cal debates over the past two decades have centered
around one key issue: the efficiency of the market
economy, and the appropriate relationship between
the market and the government. The argument of
Adam Smith [1776], the founder of modem eco-
nomics, that free markets led to efficient outcomes,
"as if by an invisible hand" has played a central role
in these debates: it suggested that we could, by and
large, rely on markets without government interven-
tion. There was, at best, a limited role for govern-
ment. The set of ideas that I will present here under-
mine Smith's theory and the view of government
that rested on it. They have suggested that the rea-
son that the hand may be invisible is that it is sim-
ply not there-or at least that if is there, it is palsied.
When I began the study of economics some forty
one years ago, I was struck by the incongruity
between the models that I was taught and the world
that I had seen growing up, in Gary Indiana, a city
whose rise and fall paralleled the rise and fall of the
industrial economy. Founded in 1906 by U.S. Steel,
and named after its Chairman of the Board, it had
declined to but a shadow of its former self by the
end of the century. But even in its heyday, it was
marred by poverty, periodic unemployment, and
massive racial discrimination. Yet the theories that
we were taught paid little attention to poverty, said
that all markets cleared-including the labor mar-
ket, so unemployment must be nothing more than a
phantasm, and that the profit motive ensured that
there could not be economic discrimination.' If the
central theorems that argued that the economy was
Pareto efficient-that, in some sense, we were liv-
ing in the best of all possible worlds-were true, it
seemed to me that we should be striving to create a
different world. As a graduate student, I set out to
try to create models with assumptions-and con-
clusions-closer to those that accorded with the
world I saw, with all of its imperfections.
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My first visits to the developing world in 1967,
and a more extensive stay in Kenya in 1969, left an
indelible impression on me. Models of perfect mar-
kets, as badly flawed as they might seem for Europe
or America, seemed truly inappropriate for these
countries. But while many of the key assumptions
that went into the competitive equilibrium model
seemed not to fit these economies well, the ones
that attracted my attention were the imperfection of
information, the absence of markets, and the perva-
siveness and persistence of seeming dysfunctional
institutions, like sharecropping. With workers hav-
ing to surrender 50% or more of their income to
landlords, surely (if conventional economics were
correct), incentives were greatly attenuated. Tradi-
tional economics said not only that institutions (like
sharecropping)2 did not matter, but neither did the
distribution of wealth. But if workers owned their
own land, then they would not face what amounted
to a 50% tax. Surely, the distribution of wealth did
matter.
I had seen cyclical unemployment-sometimes
quite large-and the hardship it brought as I grew
up, but I had not seen the massive unemployment
that characterized African cities, unemployment
that could not be explained either by unions or min-
imum wage laws (which, even when they existed,
were regularly circumvented). Again, there was a
massive discrepancy between the models we had
been taught and what I saw.
The new ideas and models were not only useful
in addressing broad philosophical questions, such
as the appropriate role of the state, but also in ana-
lyzing concrete policy issues. In the 1970s, econo-
mists became increasingly critical of traditional
Keynesian ideas, partly because of their assumed
lack of micro-foundations. The attempts made to
construct a new macro-economics based on tradi-
tional micro-economics, with its assumptions of
well functioning markets, were doomed to failure.
Recessions and depressions, accompanied by mas-
sive unemployment, were symptomatic of massive
market failures. The market for labor was clearly
not clearing. How could a theory that began with
the assumption that all markets clear ever provide
an explanation? If individuals could easily smooth
their consumption by borrowing at safe rates of
interest, then the relatively slight loss of lifetime
income caused by an interruption of work of six
months or a year would hardly be a problem; but the
unemployed do not have access to capital markets,
at least not at reasonable terms, and thus unemploy-
ment is a cause of enormous stress. If markets were
perfect, individuals could buy private insurance
against these risks; yet it is obvious that they can-
not. Thus, one of the main developments to follow
from this line of research into the consequences of
information imperfections for the functioning of
markets is the construction of macro economic
models that help explain why the economy ampli-
fies shocks and makes them persistent, and why
there may be, even in competitive equilibrium,
unemployment and credit rationing.
I believe that some of the huge mistakes which
have been made in policy in the last decade, in for
instance the management of the East Asia crisis or
the transition of the former communist countries to
the market, might have been avoided if there had
been a better understanding of issues, like bank-
ruptcy and corporate governance, to which the new
information economics called attention. And the so-
called Washington consensus policies3, which have
predominated in the policy advice of the interna-
tional financial institutions over the past quarter
century, have been based on market fundamentalist
policies which ignored the information-theoretic
concerns, and this explains at least in part their
widespread failures.4
Information affects decision making in every
context-not just inside firms and households.
More recently, I have turned my attention to some
aspects of what might be called the political econo-
my of information: the role of information in politi-
cal processes, in collective decision making. For
two hundred years, well before the economics of
information became a subdiscipline within econom-
ics, Sweden had enacted legislation to increase
transparency. There are asymmetries of information
between those governing and those governed, and
just as markets strives to overcome asymmetries of
information, we need to look for ways by which the
scope for asymmetries of information in political
processes can be limited and their consequences
mitigated.
THE HISTORICAL SETTING
I do not want here to review and describe in
detail the models of information asymmetries that
have been constructed in the past thirty years. In
recent years, there have been a number of survey
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articles,' even several books,6 and interpretative
essays.'7 I do want to highlight some of the dramat-
ic impacts that information economics has had on
how economics is approached today, how it has
provided explanations to phenomena that were pre-
viously unexplained, how it has altered our views
about how the economy functions, and, perhaps
most importantly, how it has led to a rethinking of
the appropriate role for government in our society.
In describing the ideas, I want to trace out some of
their origins: to a large extent, they were responses
to attempts to answer specific policy questions or to
explain specific phenomena to which the standard
theory provided an inadequate explanation. But any
discipline has a life of its own, a prevailing para-
digm, with assumptions and conventions. Much of
the work was motivated by an attempt to explore
the limits of that paradigm-to see how the stan-
dard models could embrace problems of informa-
tion imperfections (which turned out not to be very
well.)
For more than a hundred years, formal modeling
in economics has focused on models in which infor-
mation was perfect. Of course, everyone recognized
that information was in fact imperfect, but the hope,
following Marshall's dictum "Natura non facit
saltum," was that economies in which information
was not too imperfect would look very much like
economies in which information was perfect. One
of the main results of our research showed that this
was not true; that even a small amount of informa-
tion imperfection could have a profound effect on
the nature of the equilibrium.
The reigning paradigm of the twentieth century,
the neoclassical model, ignored the warnings of the
nineteenth century and earlier masters on how
information concerns might alter the analyses, per-
haps because they could not see how to embrace
them in their seemingly precise models, perhaps
because doing so would have led to uncomfortable
conclusions about the efficiency of markets. For
instance, Smith, in anticipating later discussions of
adverse selection, wrote that as firms raise interest
rates, the best borrowers drop out of the market. If
lenders know perfectly the risks associated with
each borrower, this would matter little; each bor-
rower would be charged an appropriate risk premi-
um. It is because lenders do not know the default
probabilities of borrowers perfectly that this
process of adverse selection has such important
consequences. 8
I have already noted in the introduction that
something was wrong-seriously wrong-with the
competitive equilibrium models that represented
the prevailing paradigm when we went to graduate
school. It seemed to say that unemployment didn't
exist, that issues of efficiency and equity could be
neatly separated, so that economists could neatly set
aside problems of inequality and poverty as they
went about their business of designing more effi-
cient economic systems. But there were a host of
other predictions, empirical puzzles, that were hard
to reconcile with the standard theory: in micro-eco-
nomics, there were tax paradoxes such as why did
firms seemingly not take actions which minimized
their tax liabilities, security market paradoxes, such
as why did asset prices seem to exhibit such high
volatility,9 and behavioral puzzles, such as why did
firms respond to risks in ways which were marked-
ly different from that predicted by the theory.'° In
macro-economics, the cyclical movements of many
of the key aggregate variables, such as consump-
tion,"1 inventories,'2 real product wages,"3 real con-
sumption wages,'4 and interest rates'5 are hard to
reconcile with the standard theory, and if the perfect
market assumptions were even approximately satis-
fied, the distress caused by cyclical movements in
the economy would be much less than seems to be
the case.'6
The problems that we saw with the models that
we were taught was not only that they seemed
wrong, but that they left a host of phenomena and
institutions unexplained-why were IPO's typical-
ly sold at a discount? Why did equities, which pro-
vided far better risk diversification than debt, play
such a limited role in financing new investment?' 7
There were, to be sure, some Ptolemaic attempts
to defend and elaborate on the old model. Some,
like George Stigler,'8 while recognizing the impor-
tance of information, argued that once the real costs
of information were taken into account, even with
imperfect information, the standard results of eco-
nomics would still hold. Information was just a
transactions cost. In the approach of many Chicago
economists, information economics was like any
other branch of applied economics; one simply ana-
lyzed the special factors determining the demand
and supply for information, just as agricultural eco-
nomics analyzed those factors affecting the market
for wheat. For the more mathematically inclined,
information could be incorporated into production
functions of, say, goods by inserting an "I" for the
THE AMERICAN ECONOMIST8
input "information," and "I" itself could be pro-
duced by inputs, like labor. Our analysis showed
that that this approach was wrong, as were the con-
clusions derived from it.
Practical economists who could not ignore the
bouts of unemployment which had plagued capital-
ism since its inception talked of the neoclassical
synthesis: using Keynesian interventions to ensure
that the economy remained at full employment, and
once that was done, the standard neoclassical
propositions would once again be true. But while
the neoclassical synthesis"9 had enormous intellec-
tual influence, by the 1970s and 80s it came under
attack from two sides. It was an assertion, not based
on a coherent view of the economy. One side
attacked the underpinnings of Keynesian econom-
ics, its micro-foundations; why would rational
actors be out of equilibrium-with unemployment
persisting-in the way that Keynes had suggested.
This side effectively denied the phenomena which
Keynes was attempting to explain.
Worse still, some saw unemployment as largely
reflecting an interference (e.g. by government in
setting minimum wages, or trade unions, in using
their monopoly power to set wages too high) with
the free workings of the market, with the obvious
implication: unemployment would be eliminated if
markets were made more flexible, that is, if unions
and government interventions were eliminated.
Even if wages fell a third in the Great Depression,
they should have, in this view, fallen even more.
There was an alternative perspective (articulated
more fully in Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1987a,
1988b): why shouldn't we believe that massive
unemployment was just the tip of the iceberg, of
more pervasive market efficiencies that were hard-
er to detect. If markets seemed to function so badly
some of the time, certainly they must be malper-
forming in more subtle ways much of the time. The
economics of information bolstered the latter view.
Similarly, given the nature of the debt contracts,
the falling prices led to bankruptcy and economic
disruptions, actually exacerbating the economic
downturn. Had there been more wage and price
flexibility, matters might have been even worse.
Moreover, neither government nor unions imposed
the limitations on wage and price dynamics in many
sectors of the economy; at the very least, those who
argued that the problem was wage and price rigidi-
ties had to look for other market imperfections, and
any policy remedy (including a call for greater flex-
ibility) had to take those factors into account.
In the next section, I shall explain how it was not
just the discrepancies between the standard compet-
itive model and its predictions which lead to its
being questioned. The model was not robust-even
slight departures from the underlying assumption of
perfect information had large consequences.
But before turning to those issues, it may be use-
ful to describe some of the concrete issues which
underlay the beginnings of my research program in
this area. Key in my thinking on these issues was
the time between 1969 and 1971 that I spent at the
Institute for Development Studies at the University
of Nairobi with the support of the Rockefeller
Foundation.
Education as a screening device20
The newly independent Kenyan government, as
it attempted to forge policies which would promote
their growth and development, was asking ques-
tions that never seemingly been raised by their
colonial masters. How much should it invest in edu-
cation? It was clear that a better education got one
better jobs-the credential put one at the head of the
job queue. Gary Fields, a young scholar working at
the Institute of Development Studies there, devel-
oped a simple model2 ' suggesting that the private
returns to education-the enhanced probability of
getting a good job-differed from the social return;
and that it was possible that as more people get edu-
cated, the private returns got higher (it was even
more necessary to get the credential) even though
the social return might decline. Here, education was
performing a markedly different function than it did
in traditional economics literature, where it simply
added to human capital and improved productivi-
ty.22'23 The analysis had important implications for
Kenya's decision about how much to invest in high-
er education. The problem with Fields' work was
that it did not provide a full equilibrium analysis:
wages were fixed, rather than competitively deter-
mined.
This led me to ask, what would the market equi-
librium look like if wages were set equal to mean
marginal products conditional on the information
that was available? And this in turn forced me to
ask: what were the incentives and mechanisms for
employers and employees to acquire or transmit
information? Within a group of otherwise similar
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job applicants (who therefore face the same wage),
the employer has an incentive to identify who is the
most able, to find some way of sorting or screening
among them, if he could keep that information pri-
vate. But he often can't, and if others find out about
the true ability, the wage will be bid up, and he will
be unable to appropriate the return to the informa-
tion. At the very beginning of this research program
we had thus identified one of the key issues in infor-
mation economics, the difficulty of appropriating
the returns.
On the other hand, the employee, if he knew his
ability (that is, if there were asymmetries of infor-
mation between the employee and the employer)
and he knew that his abilities were above the aver-
age of those in the market, he would have an incen-
tive to convince the employer of his ability. But
someone at the bottom of the ability distribution
had an incentive not have the information revealed.
Here was a second principle that was to be explored
in subsequent years: there are incentives on the part
of individuals for information not to be revealed,
for secrecy, or, in modem parlance, for a lack of
transparency. This raised a question: how did the
forces for secrecy and for information disclosure
get balanced? What was the equilibrium that
emerged? I will postpone until the next section a
description of that equilibrium.
Efficiency wage theory
That summer in Kenya I began three other
research projects related to information imperfec-
tions. At the time I was working in Kenya, there
was heavy urban unemployment. My colleagues at
the Institute for Development Studies, Michael
Todaro and John Harris had formulated a simple
model of labor migration from the rural to the urban
sector which accounted for the unemployment.
High urban wages attracted workers, and they were
willing to risk unemployment for the chance of
those higher wages.4 Here was a simple, general
equilibrium model of unemployment, but again
there was one missing piece: how could you explain
the high wages, which were well in excess of the
minimum wage? It did not seem as if either gov-
emmnent or unions were forcing these high wages.
One needed an equilibrium theory of wage determi-
nation. I recalled, during an earlier stint at Cam-
bridge, discussions with Harvey Leibenstein who
had postulated that in very poor countries, higher
wages lead to higher productivity.25 It might not pay
firms to cut wages, if productivity was cut more
than proportionately, even if there was an excess
supply of labor. The key insight was to recognize
that there were a variety of other reasons why, when
information and contracting were imperfect, pro-
ductivity might depend on wages.29 In that case, it
might pay firms to pay a higher wage than the min-
imum necessary to hire labor; such wages I referred
to as efficiency wages. With efficiency wages, there
could exist an equilibrium level of unemployment.
I explored four explanations for why productivity
might depend on wages (besides nutrition). The
simplest was that lower wages lead to higher
turnover, and therefore the higher turnover costs
which the firm bore.27 It was not until some years
later that we were able to explain more fully-
based on limitations of information-why it was
that firms had to bear these turnover costs.2 1
But there was another version of the efficiency
wage related to the work I was beginning on asym-
metric information. Any manager will tell you that
you attract better workers by paying them higher
wages. This was just an application of the general
notion of adverse selection, which played a central
role in earlier insurance literature, where firms had
long recognized that as they charge a higher premi-
um, the best risks stopped buying insurance.29 Firms
in a market do not passively have to accept the
"market wage." Even in competitive markets, finns
could, if they wanted, offer higher wages than oth-
ers. Market clearing was not a constraint on firms.
If all finns were paying the market-clearing wage,
it might pay a firm to offer a higher wage, to attract
more able workers. The efficiency wage theory
meant that there could exist unemployment in equi-
librium.
It was thus clear that the notion that had under-
lay much of traditional competitive equilibrium
analysis-that markets had to clear-was simply
not true if information were imperfect.
The formulation of the efficiency wage theory
that has received the most attention over the years,
however, has been the one that has focused on prob-
lems of incentives. Many firms claim that paying
high wages induces their workers to work harder.
The problem that Carl Shapiro and I [1984] faced
was to try to make sense of this claim. If all work-
ers are identical, and were paid the same wage, then
if it paid one firm to pay a high wage, it would pay
all of them. But if a worker was then fired for shirk-
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ing, and there was full employment, he could
immediately get another job, at the same wage. The
high wage would provide no incentive. But if there
was unemployment, then there was a price for
shirking. We showed that in equilibrium there had
to be unemployment: unemployment was the disci-
pline device that forced workers to work?"0 The
model had strong policy implications, some of
which I shall describe below. Our work illustrated
the use of highly simplified models to help clarify
thinking about quite complicated matters. In prac-
tice, of course, workers are not identical, so prob-
lems of adverse selection become intertwined with
those of incentives; being fired does convey infor-
mation-there is typically a stigma.
(There was a fourth version of the efficiency
wage, where productivity was related to morale
effects, perceptions about how fairly they were
being treated. While I briefly discussed this version
in my earlier work,31 it was not until almost twenty
years later that the idea was fully developed, in the
important work of Akerlof and Yellen [1990].)
Sharecropping and the general theory of
incentives
This work on the economics of incentives in
labor markets was closely related to the third
research project that I began in Kenya. In tradition-
al economic theory, while considerable lip service
was paid to incentives, there was no real incentive
issue. With perfect information, individuals are paid
to perform a particular service; if they perform it
they receive the amount contracted for; if they do
not perform, they receive nothing. With imperfect
information, firms have to motivate and monitor,
rewarding them for observed good performance and
punishing them for bad. My interest in the issues
was first aroused by thinking about sharecropping,
a common form of land tenancy in a developing
country, where the worker surrenders half (some-
times two thirds) of the produce to the landlord in
return for the use of his land. At first blush, this
seemed a highly inefficient arrangement; it was
equivalent to a 50% tax on workers' labor. But what
were the alternatives? The worker could rent the
land, but that meant he had to bear all the risk of
fluctuations in output; and besides, he often did not
have the requisite capital. He could work as wage
labor, but that meant that the landlord would have to
monitor him, to ensure that he worked. Sharecrop-
ping represented a compromise, between risk bear-
ing and incentives. The underlying information
problem was that the input of the worker could not
be observed, but only his output, and his output was
not perfectly correlated with his input. The share-
cropping contract could be thought of as a combi-
nation of a rental contract plus an insurance con-
tract, in which the landlord "rebates" part of the rent
if crops turn out badly. There is not full insurance
(which would be equivalent to a wage contract)
because such insurance would attenuate all incen-
tives. The adverse effect of insurance on incentives
to avoid the insured against contingency is referred
to as moral hazard.32 In Stiglitz [1974b] I analyzed
the equilibrium sharecropping contract. In that
paper, I recognized that the incentive problems I
explored there were isomorphic to those facing
modem corporations, e.g. in providing incentives to
their managers,33 and there followed a large litera-
ture on optimal and equilibrium incentive schemes34
in labor, capital, and insurance markets. Contracts
had to be based on observables, like processes (or
which crops were grown) and observable inputs
(like fertilizers). Many of the results obtained earli-
er in the work on adverse selection had their paral-
lel in this area of "adverse incentives."3 5 For
instance, with Richard Arnott I analyzed the equi-
librium [1988a, 1988b], which entails partial insur-
ance.
Equilibrium wage and price distributions
The fourth strand of research looked at the issue
of wage differentials that I had observed from a dif-
ferent perspective. The work on labor turnover had
suggested that finns that faced higher turnover
costs might pay higher wages. But one of the rea-
sons that individuals quit was to obtain a higher
paying job. The turnover rate depended on the wage
distribution. The challenge was to formulate an
equilibrium model, in which there was a wage dis-
tribution, which led firms to charge different
wages-the distribution of wages that had original-
ly been postulated.
More generally, efficiency wage theory said that
it paid firms to pay a higher wage than necessary to
obtain workers; but the level of the efficiency wage
could vary across firms; for instance, finms with
higher turnover costs, or where worker inefficiency
could lead to large losses of capital, or where mon-
itoring was more difficult, might find it desirable to
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pay higher wages. The implication was that similar
labor might receive quite different compensation;
wage discrepancies might not be explicable solely
in terms of differences in abilities.
I was to return to these four themes repeatedly in
my research over the following three decades.
FROM THE COMPETITIVE
EQUILIBRIUM PARADIGM TO THE
INFORMATION PARADIGM
In the previous section, I described how my
experiences, especially in Kenya-the disparities
between the models used and the world that I saw-
had motivated a search for an alternative paradigm.
But there was another motivation, driven more by
the intemal logic and structure of the competitive
model itself, which was the dominant paradigm
thirty years ago.
The model virtually made economics a branch of
engineering (with no aspersions to that noble pro-
fession), and the participants in the economy better
or worse engineers. Each was solving a maximiza-
tion problem, with full information: households
maximizing utility subject to budget constraints,
firms maximizing profits (market value), and the
two interacting in competitive product, labor, and
capital markets. One of the peculiar implications
was that there never were disagreements about what
the firm should do: alternative management teams
would presumably come up with the same solution
to the maximization problems. Another peculiar
implication was the meaning of risk: when a firm
said that a project was risky, that (should have)
meant that it was highly correlated with the busi-
ness cycle, not that it had a high chance of failure.36
I have already described some of the other peculiar
implications of the model: the fact that there was no
unemployment or credit rationing, that it focused on
only a limited subset of the information problems
facing society, that it seemed not to address key
issues-like incentives and motivation.
But much of the research in the profession is
directed not at these big lacunae, but at seemingly
more technical issues-at the mathematical struc-
tures. The underlying mathematics required
assumptions of convexity and continuity, and with
these assumptions one could prove the existence of
equilibrium and its (Pareto) efficiency. The stan-
dard proofs of these fundamental theorems of wel-
fare economics did not even list in their enumerat-
ed assumptions those concerning information: the
perfect information assumption was so ingrained it
did not have to be explicitly stated. The economic
assumptions to which the proofs of efficiency
called attention concemed the absence of externali-
ties and public goods. The market failures approach
to the economics of the public sector37 discussed
alternative approaches by which these market fail-
ures could be corrected, but these market failures
were highly circumscribed.
There was, moreover, a curious disjunction
between the language economists used to explain
markets and the models they constructed. They
talked about the information efficiency of the mar-
ket economy, though they focused on a single infor-
mation problem, that of scarcity. But there are a
myriad of other information problems faced by con-
sumers and firms every day, concerning for instance
the prices and qualities of the various objects that
are for sale in the market, the quality and efforts of
the workers they hire, the returns of investment pro-
jects. In the standard paradigm, the competitive
general equilibrium model,3" there were no shocks,
no unanticipated events: at the beginning of time,
the full equilibrium was solved, and everything
from then on was an unfolding over time of what
had been planned in each of the contingencies. In
the real world, the critical question was how, and
how well, do markets handle these information
problems?
There were other aspects of the standard para-
digm which seemed hard to accept. It argued that
institutions did not matter-markets could see
through them, and equilibrium was simply deter-
mined by the laws of supply and demand. It said
that the distribution of wealth did not matter.39 And
it said that (by and large) history did not matter-
knowing preferences and technology and initial
endowments, one could describe the time path of
the economy.40
Work on the economics of information began by
questioning each of the underlying premises, each
of the central theorems. Consider, to begin with, the
mathematical structures that had underlay some
much of the formalization of economics of the lat-
ter half of the twentieth century, the convexity
assumptions which corresponded to long standing
principles of diminishing returns. With imperfect
information (and the costs of acquiring it) these
assumptions were no longer plausible. It was not
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just that the cost of acquiring information could be
viewed as fixed costs. 41 Work with Roy Radner
(Radner and Stiglitz [1984]) showed that there was
a fundamental non-concavity in the value of infor-
mation, that is, under quite general conditions, it
never paid to buy just a little bit of information.
Work with Richard Arnott (Arnott and Stiglitz
[1988a]) showed that such problems were pervasive
in even the simplest of moral hazard problems
(where individuals had a choice of alternative
actions, e.g. the amount of risk to undertake.) While
we had not repealed the law of diminishing returns,
we had shown its domain to be more limited than
had previously been realized.42
Michael Rothschild and I showed that under nat-
ural formulations of what might be meant by a com-
petitive market with imperfect information, equilib-
rium often did not exist43-even when there was an
arbitrarily small amount of information imperfec-
tion.4 While subsequent research has looked for
alternative definitions of equilibrium,45 we remain
unconvinced; most of them violate the natural
meaning of competition, i.e. where each participant
in the market is so small that he believes that he will
have no effect on the behavior of others. (Roth-
schild and Stiglitz [1997]).
The new information paradigm went further in
undermining the foundations of competitive equi-
librium analysis, the basic "laws" of economics,
which include: the law of demand and supply (hold-
ing that market equilibrium was characterized by
market clearing), the law of the single price, hold-
ing that the same good sold for a single price
throughout the market, the law of the competitive
price, holding that in equilibrium price equaled
marginal cost, the efficient markets hypothesis,
holding that in stock markets prices convey all the
relevant information from the informed to the unin-
formed. Each of these cornerstones was rejected, or
was shown to hold under much more restrictive
conditions.
We have shown how, when prices affect "qual-
ity"-either because of incentive or selection
effects-equilibrium may be characterized by
demand not equaling supply; firms will not pay
lower wages to workers, even when they can
obtain such workers, because doing so will
raise their labor costs; fimns will not charge
higher interest rates, even when they can do so,
because of an excess demand for credit,
because doing so will increase the average
default rate, and thus lower expected returns.
* We have shown that the market will be charac-
terized by wage and price distributions, even
when there is no exogenous source of "noise"
in the economy, even when all finns and work-
ers are (otherwise) identical.
* We have shown that in equilibrium, firms will
charge a price in excess of the marginal costs,
or workers are paid a wage in excess of their
reservation wage. The "surplus" is required to
provide the incentive for maintaining a reputa-
tion.46 Even in situations where reputation rents
were not required, information imperfections
gave rise to market power-there is imperfect
competition-which results in firns charging
prices in excess of marginal cost.47
* The efficient markets hypothesis43 held that
prices in the stock market fully reflected all
information. But if that were the case, then
there would be no incentive for anyone to
expend money to collect information. Work
with Sanford Grossman [1976, 1980a] showed
that the price system both imperfectly aggre-
gated information and that there was an equi-
librium amount of "disequilibrium."
The most fundamental reason why markets with
imperfect information differ from the perfect ones
is that actions (including choices) convey informa-
tion, market participants know this, and this affects
their behavior.
A decision by a firm to provide a guarantee is not
just a matter that the firm is better able to absorb the
risk of a product failure; his willingness to provide
a guarantee conveys information about his confi-
dence in the product. An insured is willing to take a
policy with a large deductible not because he is not
risk averse, but because this action conveys infor-
mation to the insurance company, that he is willing
to bear the risk because he thinks the likelihood of
an accident is low. At the same time, a firm may not
assign an employee to a highly visible job because
it knows that the assignment will be interpreted as
an indication that the employee is good, making it
more likely that a rival will try to hire the person
away. Even if he fails, the current employer will
have to pay a higher salary.
One of the early insights (Akerlof, 1971) was
that markets may be thin or absent. One of the stan-
dard assumptions of the old paradigm was that there
was a complete set of markets-including intertem-
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poral markets (capital markets) and risk markets.
The absence of particular markets, e.g. for risk, has
profound implications for how other markets func-
tion. The fact that workers and firns cannot buy
insurance against many of the risks which they face
affects labor and capital markets; it leads, for
instance, to labor contracts in which the employer
provides some insurance. But the design of these
more complicated, but still imperfect and incom-
plete, contracts, affects the efficiency, and overall
performance, of the economy.
Perhaps most importantly, under the standard
paradigm, markets are Pareto efficient, except when
one of a limited number of market failures occurs.
Under the imperfect information paradigm, markets
are almost never Pareto efficient.
While information economics thus undermined
these long standing principles of economics, it also
provided explanations for many phenomena that
had long been unexplained. Earlier, I mentioned the
seemingly inefficient institution of sharecropping,
for which information economics provided an
explanation. Before turning to these applications, I
want to present a somewhat more systematic
account of the principles of the economics of infor-
mation.
Some problems in constructing an
alternative paradigm
The fact that information was imperfect was, of
course, well recognized by all economists. While
they may have hoped that economies with imper-
fect information behaved much like economies with
perfect information, the real reason that models
with imperfect information were not developed was
that it was not obvious how to do so. There were
several problems that had to be overcome: while
there was a single way in which information is per-
fect, there are an infinite number of ways in which
information can be imperfect. One of the keys to
success was formulating simple models in which
the set of relevant information could be fully speci-
fied-and so the precise ways in which information
was imperfect could also be fully specified. But
there was a danger in this methodology, as useful as
it was: in these over simplistic models, there were
sometimes ways in which there could be full infor-
mation revelation; the information problems could
be fully resolved. In the real world, of course, this
never happens, which is why in some of the later
work (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz [1976, 1980a], we
worked with models with an infinite number of
states.49
Perhaps the hardest problem was modeling equi-
librium. It was important to think about both sides
of the market-employers and employees, the
insurance company and the insured, lender and bor-
rower. Each had to be modeled as "rational," in
some sense, making inferences on the basis of
available information. Each side's behavior too had
to be rational, based on beliefs about the conse-
quences of their actions; and those consequences in
turn depended on what inferences others would
draw from those actions. I wanted to model com-
petitive behavior, where each actor in the economy
was small, and believed he was small-and so his
actions could not or would not affect the equilibri-
um (though others' inferences about himself might
be affected). Finally, one had to think carefully
about what was the feasible set of actions: what
might each side do to extract or convey information
to others.
As we shall see, the variety of results obtained
(and much of the confusion in the early literature)
arose partly from a failure to be as clear as one
might about the assumptions. For instance, the stan-
dard adverse selection model had the quality of the
good offered in the market (say of used cars, or risk-
iness of the insured) depending on price. The car
buyer (the seller of insurance) knows the statistical
relationship between price and quality, and this
affects his demand. The market equilibrium is the
price at which demand equals supply. But that is an
equilibrium if and only if there is no way by which
the seller of a good car can convey that information
to the buyer-so that he can earn a quality premi-
um-and if there is no way by which the buyer can
sort out good cars from bad cars. Typically, there
are such ways, and it is the attempt to elicit that
information which has profound effects on how
markets function. To develop a new paradigm, we
had to break out from long established premises, to
ask what should be taken as assumptions and what
should be derived from the analysis. Market clear-
ing could not be taken as an assumption; neither
could the premise that a firm sells a good at a par-
ticular price to all customers. One could not begin
the analysis even by assuming that in competitive
equilibrium there would be zero profits. In the stan-
dard theory, if there were positive profits, a firm
might enter, bidding away existing customers. In
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the new theory, the attempt to bid away new cus-
tomers by slightly lowering prices might lead to
marked changes in their behavior or in the mix of
customers, in such a way that the profits of the
new entrant actually became negative. One had to
rethink all the conclusions from first premises.
We made progress in our analyses because we
began with highly simplified models of particular
markets, that allowed us to think through careful-
ly each of the assumptions and conclusions. From
the analysis of particular markets (whether the
insurance market, as in Rothschild Stiglitz, the
education market, the labor market, or the land
tenancy/sharecropping market), we attempted to
identify general principles, to explore how these
principles operated in each of the other markets. In
doing so, we identified particular features, partic-
ular informational assumptions, which seemed to
be more relevant in one market or another. The
nature of competition in the labor market is differ-
ent than that in the insurance market or the capital
market, though they have much in common. This
interplay, between looking at the ways in which
such markets are similar and dissimilar, proved to
be a fruitful research strategy.50
SOURCES OF ASYMMETRIES OF
INFORMATION
Information imperfections are pervasive in the
economy: indeed, it is hard to imagine what a
world with perfect information would be like.
Much of the research I will describe below focus-
es on asymmetries of information, the fact that dif-
ferent people know different things: workers know
more about their ability than does the finn; the
person buying insurance knows more about his
health, whether he smokes and drinks immoder-
ately, than the insurance firm; the owner of a car
knows more about the car than potential buyers;
the owner of a firm knows more about the firm
that a potential investor; the borrower knows more
about his risk and risk taking than the lender.
The essential feature of a decentralized market
economy is that different people know different
things; in this sense, economists had long been
thinking of markets with information asymme-
tries. But the earlier literature had neither thought
about how they were created, nor what their con-
sequences might be. Moreover, while much of the
earlier literature focused on simple situations of
information asymmetry-such as those described
in the previous paragraphs, the problems of infor-
mation imperfections run deeper, and the research
described below discusses some of these more
general results. The individual may know little
about his true health condition; the insurance com-
pany, through a simple examination, might even
become more informed (at least concerning rele-
vant aspects, e.g. implications for life expectancy).
Some of these information asymmetries are
inherent: the individual naturally knows more
about himself than does anyone else. Some of the
asymmetries arise naturally out of economic
processes. The current employer knows more
about the employee than other potential employ-
ers; a firm may find out a great deal of information
in the process of dealing with suppliers that others
may not know; the owner of a car naturally knows
the faults of the car better than others-and in par-
ticular, he knows whether or not he has a lemon.
While such information asymmetries inevitably
arise, the extent to which they do so and their con-
sequences depend on how the market is structured,
and the recognition that they will arise affects
market behavior. For instance, one of the impor-
tant insights of work in this area is to show how
information asymmetries lead to thin or non-exis-
tent markets (Akerlof [1970]). But this means that
even if an individual has no more information
about his ability than potential employers, the
moment he goes to work for an employer, an infor-
mation asymmetry has been created-the employ-
er may know more about the individual's ability
than others. The consequence is that the "used
labor" market does not work well. Others will be
more tame in bidding for his services, knowing
that they will succeed in luring him away from his
current employer only if they bid too much. If they
bid less than his productivity, his current employ-
er will match. Labor mobility is impeded. But that
gives market power to the first employer, which he
will be tempted to exercise. The recognition of this
naturally affects even the "new labor" market.
Because an individual is locked into a job, he will
be more risk averse in accepting an offer. The
terms of the initial contract have to be designed to
reflect the diminution of the workers' bargaining
power and his reduced labor mobility that occurs
immediately after signing.5 ' 52
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To take another example, it is natural that in the
process of oil exploration, a company finds out
information that is relevant for the likelihood that
there will be oil in a neighboring tract. There is an
informational externality. 53 The existence of this
asymmetric information affects the nature of the
bidding for oil rights on the neighboring tract.
Bidding where there is known to be asymmetries
of information will be markedly different from
that where such asymmetries do not exist.54 Those
who are uninformed will presume that they will
win only if they bid too much-information asym-
metries exacerbate the problem of the winners'
curse.55 The government (or other owners of large
tracts to be developed) should take this into
account in its leasing strategy. And the bidders in
the initial leases too will take this into account:
part of the value of winning in the initial auction is
the information rent that will accrue in later
rounds.
Creating asymmetries and imperfections of
information
While early work in the economics of informa-
tion dealt with how markets overcame problems of
information asymmetries, and information imper-
fections more generally, later work turned to how
markets create information problems, partly in an
attempt to exploit market power. Managers of
finns attempt to entrench themselves, increasing
their bargaining power, e.g. vis-a-vis alternative
management teams,56 and one of the ways that they
do this is to take actions which increase informa-
tion asymmetries. (Edlin and Stiglitz [1995]).
Doing so effectively reduces competition in the
market for management. This is an example of the
general problem of corporate governance, to
which I alluded earlier, and to which I will return
later.
Similarly, the presence of information imper-
fections give rise to market power; and firms can
exploit this market power through "sales" and
other ways of differentiating among individuals
who have different search costs. (Salop, 1977,
Salop and Stiglitz, 1976, 1982, Stiglitz 1979a).
The price dispersions which exist in the market are
created by the market-they are not just the fail-
ure of markets to arbitrage fully price differences




I now want to discuss briefly the ways by which
information asymmetries are dealt with, how they
can be (partially) overcome.
Incentives for gathering and disclosing
information
There are two key issues: what are the incentives
for obtaining information, and what are the mecha-
nisms. My brief discussion of the analysis of educa-
tion as a screening device suggested the fundamen-
tal incentives: more able individuals (lower risk
individuals, firms with better products) will receive
a higher wage (will have to pay a lower premium,
will receive a higher price for their products) if they
can establish that they are more productive (lower
risk, higher quality).
We noted earlier that while some individuals
have an incentive to disclose information, those
who are less able have an incentive not to have the
information disclosed. Was it possible that in mar-
ket equilibrium, only some of the information
would be revealed? One of the early important
results was that, if the more able succeed (costless-
ly) to establish that they are more able, then the
market will be fully revealing, even though all of
those who are below average would prefer that no
information be revealed. In the simplest models, I
described a process of unraveling: if the most able
could establish his ability, he would; but then all but
the most able would be grouped together, receiving
the mean marginal product of that group; and the
most able of that group would have an incentive to
reveal his ability. And so on down the line, until
there was full revelation.5 7
What happens if those who are more able cannot
credibly convince potential employers of their abil-
ity (or if those who are low risk cannot convince
potential insurance companies)? The other side of
the market has an incentive too to gather informa-
tion: an employer that can find a worker who is bet-
ter than is recognized by others will have found a
bargain; his wage will be determined by what oth-
ers think of him. The problem, as we noted, is that
if what he knows becomes known to others, the
wage will be bid up, and he will be unable to appro-
priate the returns on his investment in information
acquisition.
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The fact that if there was competition, it would
be difficult for the screener to appropriate the
returns had an important implication: in markets
where, for one reason or another, the more able (the
firms with the better investment projects, the more
able workers) cannot (fully) convey their attributes,
if there is to be investment in screening there must
be imperfect competition in screening. The econo-
my, in effect, has to choose between two different
imperfections: imperfections of information or
imperfections of competition. Of course, in the end,
there will be both forms of imperfection.58' 59
This is but one of many examples of the inter-
play between market imperfections. Earlier, for
instance, we discussed the incentive problems asso-
ciated with sharecropping, which arise when work-
ers do not own the land that they till. This problem
could be overcome if individuals could borrow
money, to buy their land. But capital market imper-
fections-limitations on the ability to borrow,
which themselves arise from information imperfec-
tions-explain why this "solution" does not work.
There is another important consequence: if mar-
kets were fully informationally efficient-that is, if
information disseminated instantaneously and per-
fectly throughout the economy-then no one would
have any incentive to gather information, so long as
there was any cost of doing so. That is why markets
cannot be fully informationally efficient. (See
Grossman and Stiglitz, 1976, 1980a.)
Mechanisms for elimination or reducing
information asymmetries
In simple models where individuals know their
own ability, or the insured knows his own risk, or
the borrower knows his own likelihood of repaying,
there might seem an easy way to resolve the prob-
lem of information asymmetry: let each person tell
his true characteristic. The underlying problem
arose from the fact that individuals did not neces-
sarily have the incentive to tell the truth. Assume
employees knew their abilities. An employer might
ask, what is your ability? The more able might
answer honestly. As we have seen, the least able
would have an incentive to lie, to say that he was
more able than he was. Talk is cheap. There had to
be some other ways by which information could be
credibly conveyed.
Screening by examination
The simplest way by which that could be done
was an exam. As I constructed a simple competitive
equilibrium model,60 two further general principles
became apparent: the gains of the more able were
largely at the expense of the less able; by establish-
ing that an individual is of higher ability, thereby
leading, in equilibrium, to higher wages, he simul-
taneously establishes that others are of lower abili-
ty. The private returns to expenditures on education
exceed the social returns. It was clear that there
were important externalities associated with infor-
mation, a theme which was to recur in later work.
But a more striking result emerged: there could
exist multiple equilibria, one in which information
was fully revealed (the market identified the high
and low ability people) and the other of which it
was not (called a pooling equilibrium). The pooling
equilibrium Pareto dominated the equilibrium with
full revelation. This work, done some thirty years
ago, established two results of important policy,
which remarkably have not been fully absorbed into
policy discussions even today. First, markets do not
provide appropriate incentives for infonnation dis-
closure. There is, in principle a role for government.
And secondly, expenditures on information may be
too great.6"
The simplest adverse selection model
But much of the information firns glean about
their employees, banks about their borrowers,
insurance companies about their insured comes not
from examinations but from making inferences
based on their behavior. This is a common practice
in life-but not in our economic models. As I have
already noted, the early discussions of adverse
selection in insurance markets recognized that as an
insurance company raised its premiums, those who
were least likely to have an accident decided not to
purchase the insurance; the willingness to purchase
insurance at a particular price conveyed informa-
tion to the insurance company.62 George Akerlof
recognized that this phenomenon was far more gen-
eral: the willingness to sell a used car, for instance,
conveyed information about whether the car was or
was not a lemon.
Bruce Greenwald [1979, 1986] took the idea one
important step further, showing how adverse selec-
tion applied to labor and capital markets:63 The will-
Vol. 47, No. 2 (Fall 2003) 17
ingness of an employer not to match the bid of a
competitor conveyed information about the current
employer's judgment of that individual's ability;
the willingness of insiders in a firm to sell stock at
a particular price conveyed information about the
insider's view of the price relative to the expected
return. Akerlof's claim that the result of these infor-
mation asymmetries was that markets would be thin
or absent helped explain why labor and capital mar-
kets often did not function well. It provided part of
the explanation for why firms raised so little of their
funds through equity (Mayer, 1990). Stigler was
wrong: imperfect information was not just like
transactions costs.
The consequences go well beyond just an absent
or missing market. Weak equity markets meant that
risks could not be divested, leading firms to act in a
risk averse manner, explaining some of what would
otherwise seem to be anomalous aspects of firm
behavior.' These capital market imperfections, in
turn, played a central role in the macro-economic
theories to be described below. We have already
described how the labor market imperfections-the
limited mobility of labor and the firm's market
power that results-affects the labor market, both
before the asymmetry of information is created in
the process of hiring and after.
The simplest adverse incentive model
In the adverse selection model, individuals dif-
fered. There was a single action which conveyed
information: they either entered or did not enter the
particular market. But information imperfections
also relate to what people do. A worker can work
harder, a borrower can undertake greater risk and
the insured can undertake greater care. The employ-
er would like to know how hard his employee
works; if he could, he would specify that in the con-
tract; the lender would like to know the actions
which borrower will undertake; if he could, he
would specify that in the contract. These asymme-
tries of information about actions are as important
as the earlier discussed asymmetries. Just as in the
adverse selection model, the seller of insurance may
try to overcome the problems posed by information
asymmetries by examination, so too in the adverse
incentive model, he may try to monitor the actions
of the insured. But examinations and monitoring are
costly and, while they yield some information, typ-
ically there remains a high level of residual infor-
mation imperfection. Just as in the adverse selection
model, the seller of insurance recognizes that the
average riskiness of the insurance applicants is
affected by the terms of the insurance contract, so
too the level of risk taking can be affected. And sim-
ilar results hold in other markets. Borrowers' risk
taking is affected by the interest rate charged.
(Stiglitz and Weiss [1981]).
Efficiency wage theory, credit rationing
While the early work in adverse selection
explored the equilibrium in markets where the sell-
er of insurance (the employer, the buyer of used
cars, the lender) was rational enough to recognize
the dependence of quality on price, he was not
rational enough to exploit as fully as he could the
information. While the law of supply and demand
had been assumed to be a law of economics, there
is in fact no law that requires the insurance firn to
sell to all who apply at the premium he announces,
the lender to lend to all who apply at the interest
rate he announces, the employer to employ all those
who apply at the wage he announces. So ingrained
was the competitive equilibrium model in the mind-
set of economists that they simply assumed price-
taking behavior. With perfect information and per-
fect competition, any firm that charged a price
higher than the others would lose all of his cus-
tomers; and at the going price, one faced a perfect-
ly elastic supply of customers. In adverse selection
and incentive models, what mattered was not just
the supply of customers or employees or borrowers,
but also their "quality"-the riskiness of the insured
or the borrower, the retums on the investment, the
productivity of the worker.
Since "quality" may increase with price, it may
pay to offer a higher wage than the market clearing
wage, for the lender to lend at an interest rate which
exceeds the market clearing interest rate. This is
true whether the dependence on quality arises from
adverse selection or adverse incentive effects (or, in
the labor market, because of morale or nutritional
effects). And what matters is that there be imperfect
information, not asymmetries of information. The
healthy who decide not to buy insurance at a high
premium do not need to know that they are healthy;
they could be as uninformed as the insurance com-
pany, but simply-perhaps because of their
health-have different preferences, e.g. they prefer
to spend more of their money on recreational sports.
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The consequence, as we have noted, is that mar-
ket equilibrium may be characterized by demand
not equaling supply: in equilibrium, the interest rate
is lower than that at which the demand for loans
equals the supply-there is credit rationing (Stiglitz
and Weiss [1981], Keeton [1979]); the wage rate is
higher than that at which the demand for labor
equals the supply-there is unemployment.65
Conveying information through actions
There is a much richer set of actions which con-
vey information beyond those on which traditional
adverse selection models have focused. An insur-
ance company wants to attract healthy applicants. It
might realize that by locating itself on the fifth floor
of a walk up building, only those with a strong heart
would apply. The willingness or ability to walk up
five floors conveys information. More subtly, it
might recognize that how far up it needs to locate
itself, if it only wants to get healthy applicants,
depends both on the premium charged and how
high it locates itself. Or it may decide to throw in
for free a membership in a health club, but charge a
higher premium. Those who value a health club-
because they will use it-willingly pay the higher
premium. But these individuals are likely to be
healthier.
There are a host of other actions which convey
information. The quality of the guarantee offered by
a firm can convey information about the quality of
the product; only firms that believe that their prod-
uct is reliable will be willing to offer a good guar-
antee. The guarantee is desirable not just because it
reduces risk, but because it conveys information.
The number of years of schooling may convey
information about the ability of an individual. More
able individuals may go to school longer, in which
case the increase in wages associated with an
increase in schooling may not be a consequence of
the human capital that has been added, but rather
simply be a result of the sorting that occurs.66 The
size of the deductible that an individual chooses in
an insurance policy may convey information about
his view about the likelihood of an accident or the
size of the accidents he anticipates-on average,
those who are less likely to have an accident may be
more willing to accept high deductibles. The will-
ingness of an entrepreneur to hold large fractions of
his wealth in a firm (or to retain large fractions of
the shares of the firm) conveys information about
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his beliefs in the finn's future performance. If a
firm promotes an individual to a particular job, it
may convey information about the firn's assess-
ment of his ability.
The fact that these actions may convey informa-
tion affects behavior. In some cases, the action will
be designed to obfuscate, to limit information dis-
closure. The firm that knows that others are looking
at who it promotes, and that it will compete more
vigorously for those, may affect the willingness of
the firm to promote some individuals or assign
them to particular jobs. (Waldman, 1984.) In others,
the action will be designed to convey information in
a credible way, to alter beliefs. The fact that cus-
tomers will treat a firm that issues a better guaran-
tee as if its product is better-and therefore be will-
ing to pay a higher price-may affect the guarantee
that the firm is willing to issue. Knowing that his
selling his shares will convey a negative signal con-
cerning his views of the future prospects of his firm,
an entrepreneur may retain more of the shares of the
firm; he will be less diversified than he otherwise
would have been (and accordingly, he may act in a
more risk averse manner).
A simple lesson emerges: some individuals wish
to convey information; some individuals wish not
to have information conveyed (either because such
information might lead others to think less well of
them, or because conveying information may inter-
fere with their ability to appropriate rents). In either
case, the fact that actions convey information leads
people to alter their behavior, and changes how
markets function. This is why information imper-
fections have such profound effects.
Once one recognizes that actions convey infor-
mation, two results follow. First, in making deci-
sions about what to do, individuals will not only
think about what they like (as in traditional eco-
nomics) but how it will affect others' beliefs about
them. If I choose to go to school longer, it may lead
others to believe that I am more able, and I will
therefore decide to stay in school longer, not
because I value what is being taught, but because I
value how it changes others' beliefs concerning my
ability. This means, of course, that we have to
rethink completely firm and household decision
making.
Secondly, we noted earlier that individuals have
an incentive to "lie"-the less able to say that they
are more able. Similarly, if it becomes recognized
that those who walk up to the fifth floor to apply for
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insurance are more healthy, then I might be willing
to do so even if I am not so healthy, simply to fool
the insurance company. If it becomes recognized
that those who stay in school longer are more able,
then I might be willing to do so, even if I am less
able, simply to fool the employers. Recognizing
this, one needs to look for ways by which informa-
tion is conveyed in equilibrium. The critical insight
as to how that could occur was provided in a paper
with Michael Rothschild [1976]. If those who were
more able, less risk prone, more credit worthy acted
in some observable way (had different preferences)
than those who were less able, less risk prone, less
credit worthy, then it might be possible to design a
set of choices, which would result in those with dif-
ferent characteristics in effect identifying them-
selves through their self-selection. One of the rea-
sons that they might behave differently is that they
know they are more able, less risk prone, more cred-
itworthy-that is there is asymmetric information.
But it is only one of the bases for self-selection.
The particular mechanism which we explored in
our insurance model illustrates how self-selection
mechanisms work. People who know they are less
likely to have an accident will be more willing to
accept an insurance policy with a high deductible,
so that an insurance company that offered two poli-
cies, one at a high premium and no deductible, one
with a low premium and high deductible, would be
able to sort out who were high risk and who low. It
is an easy matter to construct choices which thus
separate.
Monopoly and self-selection
Analyzing the choices which arise in full equi-
librium behavior turned out, however, to be a diffi-
cult task. The easiest situation to analyze was that
of a monopolist.5' He could construct a set of choic-
es that would differentiate among different types of
individuals, and analyzed whether it was profit
maximizing for him to do so fully, or to (partially)
"pool"-that is, offer a set of contracts such that
several types might choose the same one. This work
laid the foundations of a general theory of price dis-
crimination. Under standard theories of monopoly,
with perfect information, firms would have an
incentive to price discriminate perfectly (extracting
the full consumer surplus from each). If they did
this, then monopoly would in fact be non-distor-
tionary. Yet most models assumed no price discrim-
ination (that is, the monopolist offered the same
price to all customers), without explaining why they
did not do so, and argued that monopoly was dis-
tortionary. Our work showed how, given limited
information, firms could price discriminate, but
could do so only imperfectly. Subsequent work by a
variety of authors (such as Salop [1977] and Adams
and Yellen [1976]) explored a variety of ways by
which a monopolist might find out relevant charac-
teristics of his customers-the extent of discrimina-
tion limited by his ability to identify each person's
"surplus," the maximum they would be willing to
pay. (For an insurance company, the relevant char-
acteristics are not only the likelihood of having an
accident, but also the degree of risk averse, the pre-
mium that an individual would be willing to pay to
divest himself of risk.) The economics of informa-
tion thus provided the first coherent theory of
monopoly.
Self-selection and competitive equilibrium
The reason that analyzing monopoly was easy is
that the monopolist could structure the entire choice
set facing his customers. The hard question is to
describe the full competitive equilibrium, that is a
set of insurance contracts such that no one can offer
an alternative set which would be profitable. Each
firm could control the choices that he offered, but
not the choices offered by others; and the decisions
made by customers depended on the entire set of
choices available. In our 1976 paper, Rothschild
and I succeeded in analyzing this case.
Three striking results emerged from this analy-
sis. The first I have already mentioned: under plau-
sible conditions, given the natural definition of
equilibrium, equilibrium might not exist. There
were two possible forms of equilibria, pooling equi-
libria, in which the market is not able to distinguish
among the types, and separating equilibria, in
which it is. The different groups "separate out" by
taking different actions. We showed that there never
could be a pooling equilibrium-if there were a sin-
gle contract that everyone bought, there was anoth-
er contract that another firm could offer which
would "break" the pooling equilibrium. On the
other hand, there might not exist a separating equi-
librium. The cost of separation was too great. Any
putative separating equilibrium could be broken by
a profitable pooling contract, a contract which
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would be bought by both low risk and high risk
types.
Second, even small amounts of imperfections of
information can change the standard results, con-
cerning the existence and characterization of equi-
librium. Equilibrium, for instance, never exists
when the two types are very near each other. As we
have seen, the competitive equilibrium model is
simply not robust.
Thirdly, and relatedly, we now can see how the
fact that actions convey information affects the
equilibrium. In particular, our analysis here rein-
forced the earlier analysis of adverse selection
about markets not functioning well. In perfect infor-
mation models, individuals would fully divest
themselves of the risks which they face, and accord-
ingly would act in a risk neutral manner. We
explained why insurance markets would not work
well-why most risk averse individuals would buy
only partial insurance. There were numerous subse-
quent applications to other markets, reinforcing, for
instance, the earlier conclusions concerning the lim-
itations on equity markets. (The reason that the
original owners of a firm might want to sell his
shares was to "insure" himself against the risk of a
bad outcome; an owner that believed that there was
a smaller probability of a bad outcome would be
willing to buy less insurance, i.e. to divest himself
of fewer of his shares. Retention of shares can thus
be thought of as a market sorting mechanism, the
willingness to' keep these shares a "signal" of the
owners' confidence.)68
The result was important not only for the insights
it provided in the workings of an important set of
markets in the economy, but because there are
important elements of insurance in many transac-
tions and the general principle that actions convey
information, and that market transactions are great-
ly affected by this fact, has implications in a still
wider variety of contexts. The relationship between
the landlord and his tenant, or the employer and his
employee, can be viewed as containing in it an
insurance component; limitations on the ability to
divest oneself of risk are important in explaining a
host of contractual relationships.
Sorting, screening, and signaling
In equilibrium, both buyers and sellers, employ-
ers and employees, insurance company and insured,
lender and creditor are aware of the informational
consequences of their actions. Each side of the mar-
ket needs to consider the consequences, e.g. of act-
ing in a different way, or of confronting the other
side of the market with different choices. In the case
where say, the insurance company or employer or
employee takes the initiative for sorting out appli-
cants, self-selection is an alternative to examina-
tions as a sorting device. In the case where the
insured, or employee, or borrower, takes the initia-
tive for identifying himself as a better risk, a better
employee, a borrower more likely to repay, then we
say he is signaling.6 9 But of course, in equilibrium
both sides are aware of the consequences of alter-
native actions, and the differences between signal-
ing and self-selection screening models lie in the
technicalities of game theory, and in particular
whether the informed or uninformed (employee or
employer, insured or insurance company) moves
first.70
Still, some of the seeming differences between
signaling and screening models arise because of a
failure to specify a full equilibrium We noted earli-
er that there were many separating contracts, but a
unique separating equilibrium. We argued that if
one considered any other separating set of con-
tracts, then, say, in the insurance market, a firm
could come in and offer an alternative set of con-
tracts and make a profit; the original set of separat-
ing contracts could not have been an equilibrium
The same is true in, say, the education signaling
model. There are many,educational systems which
"separate"-that is, the more able choose to go to
school longer, and the wages at each level of edu-
cation correspond to the productivity of those who
go to school for that length of time. But all except
one are not in full equilibrium. Assume, for
instance, there were two types of individuals, a low
ability and a high ability. Then if the low ability
goes to 12 years of schooling, then any education
system in which the high ability went sufficiently
long-say more than 14 years-might separate. But
the low ability would recognize that if it went to
school for 11 years, it would still be treated as low
ability. The unique equilibrium level of education
for the low ability is that which maximizes his net
income (taking into account the productivity gains
and costs of education); and the unique equilibrium
level of education for the high ability is the lowest
level of education such that, if his wage corre-
sponds to his productivity at that level of education,
the low ability will still prefer to remain at his low
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level of education rather than pretend to be more
able by staying in school longer.7 '
The education system, of course, was particular-
ly infelicitous for studying market equilibrium. The
structure of the education system is largely a matter
of public choice, not of market processes. Different
countries have chosen markedly different systems.
The minimum level of education is typically not a
matter of choice, but set by the government. Within
educational systems, examinations play as impor-
tant a role as self-selection or signaling, though
given a certain standard of testing, there is a process
of self-selection involved in deciding whether to
stay in school, to try to pass the examination. 72 For
the same reason, the problems of existence which
arise in the insurance market are not relevant in the
education market-the "competitive" supply side
of the market is simply absent. But when the sig-
naling concepts are translated into contexts in
which there is a robust competitive market, the
problems of existence cannot be so easily ignored.73
Existence of equilibrium
What are we to make of the problem of exis-
tence? Clearly, insurance markets exist, even if they
are far from complete. To some extent, the market
does exhibit instability. Rates vacillate enormously;
as rates sometimes skyrocket and coverage is cur-
tailed, the public clamors for reforms. Such periods
are often followed by periods of relative stability, to
be followed by another "crisis" in the market. Most
states regulate rate setting, though at least partly for
prudential reasons and this may help stabilize the
market.
Moreover, though there is considerable evidence
for the kinds of selection processes discussed
above, there is also considerable evidence that the
market is far from as rational as the theory would
suggest. Most health insurance policies do not base
premia on the number of children, though that is an
easily observable variable which clearly affects the
risk exposure. Many insurance companies do not
use past experience as heavily as one would have
expected in setting premia, i.e. there is less experi-
ence rating.
My own suspicion, however, is that the major
limitation of Rothschild-Stiglitz is its assumption of
perfect competition; competition is far more limited
than we postulated; there are, for instance, signifi-
cant search costs, and considerable uncertainty
about how easy it is to get the insurance firm to pay
on a claim. Self-selection is still relevant, but the
model of monopoly, or some version of monopolis-
tic competition, may be more relevant than the
model of perfect competition.
THEORY OF CONTRACTS AND
INCENTIVES
The work with Rothschild was related to the ear-
lier work that I had done on incentives (sharecrop-
ping), besides the obvious way that both were con-
cemed with problems of limited information, one
focusing on selection effects and one on incentives.
Both entailed equilibrium in "contracts." The con-
tracts that had characterized economic relations in
the standard competitive model were extraordinari-
ly simple: I will pay you a certain amount if you do
such and such. If you did not perform as promised,
the pay was not given. But with perfect informa-
tion, individuals simply didn't sign contracts that
they did not intend to fulfill. Insurance contracts
were similarly simple: a payment occurred if and
only if particular specified events occurred.
The work on sharecropping and on equilibrium
with competitive insurance markets showed that
with imperfect information, a far richer set of con-
tracts would be employed, 74 and thus began a large
literature on the theory of contracting. 7"
In the simple sharecropping contracts of Stiglitz
[1974b], the contracts involved shares, fixed pay-
ments, and plot sizes, and76 more generally, optimal
payment structures related payments to observ-
ables, inputs, processes, outputs. 77' 76 Because what
went on in one market affect others, the credit,
labor, and land markets were interlinked; one could
not decentralize in the way hypothesized by the
standard perfect information model.79 The theory
thus served as the basis of the rnral organization in
developing countries.Y0
The basic principles were subsequently applied
in a variety of other market contexts. The most
obvious was the design of labor contracts.8!' 82
Payments, too, can depend on relative perfor-
mance; relative performance may convey more rel-
evant information than absolute performance. If a
particular company's stock goes up when all other
companies' stock goes up, it may say very little
about the performance of the manager. In Nalebuff
and Stiglitz [1983a, 1983b] we analyzed the design
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of these relative performance compensation
schemes (contests). One of the strong arguments for
competitive, decentralized structures is that they
provide information on the basis of which one can
design better incentive pay structures than those
which rely on the performance of a single individ-
ual only.
Credit markets too are characterized by compli-
cated contracts. Lenders would specify not only an
interest rate, but also impose other conditions (col-
lateral requirements, equity requirements) which
would have both incentive and selection effects." 3
Indeed, the simultaneous presence of both selection
and incentive effects was important: in the absence
of the former, it might be possible to increase the
collateral requirement and raise interest rates, still
ensuring that the borrower undertook the safe pro-
ject.84
Incentives in market equilibrium
Incentives are based on rewards and punish-
ments. In modern economies, the most severe pun-
ishment that one can impose is to fire an individ-
ual.85 But if the individual could get a job just like
his current one, then there would be no cost. Good
behavior is driven by eaming a surplus over what
one could get elsewhere. Thus, in labor markets, the
wage must be higher than what the worker could get
elsewhere (which may be zero, if there is unem-
ployment); in the goods market, firms must feel a
loss when they lose a customer because of a shod-
dy product, so the price must exceed the marginal
cost of production. Thus, the long standing pre-
sumption that in competitive equilibrium price
equals marginal cost cannot be true in markets with
imperfect information. (See Shapiro and Stiglitz
[1984], Shapiro [1983] and Klein and Leffler
[1981].)
EQUILIBRIUM WAGE AND PRICE
DISTRIBUTIONS
One of the most obvious differences between the
predictions of the model with perfect information
and what we see in every day life is the conclusion
that the same good sell for the same price every-
where. We all spend a considerable amount of time
shopping for good bargains. The differences in
prices represent more than just differences in quali-
ty (service). There are real price differences. Since
Stigler's classic paper [1961], there has been a large
literature exploring optimal search behavior.
Stigler, and most of the search literature, took, how-
ever, the price or wage distribution as given. They
did not ask how did it arise. Given the search costs,
could it be sustained? For instance, if search costs
are relatively low, one might have thought (if one
bought the older theories) that markets would look
very much like they would with zero search costs,
in which case there would be no price or wage dis-
tribution. It is not surprising that given that infor-
mation is costly, if there are shocks to the econo-
my-the demand for a good goes up in some locale,
so price there rises-that prices are not fully arbi-
traged instantaneously. But much of the wage and
price dispersion cannot be related to such "shocks."
Our analysis of efficiency wage theory provided
an alternative explanation. We showed that it paid
firms to pay more than they had to, e.g. to reduce
labor turnover costs. But it might pay some firms to
pay higher wages than others.
As I began to analyze these models, an important
insight occurred: there could be a wage distribution
even if all firms were identical, e.g. faced the same
search costs. It was clear that even small search
costs could make a large difference to the behavior
of product and labor markets. This was a point that
Diamond [1971] had independently made in a high-
ly influential paper, which serves to illustrate pow-
erfully the lack of robustness of the competitive
equilibrium theory. Assume, as in the standard the-
ory, all firms were charging the competitive price,
but there were an epsilon cost of searching, of going
to another store. Then any firm which charged
epsilon/2 greater would lose no customers. It would
thus pay him to increase his price. And it would
similarly pay all other firms to increase their prices.
But at the higher price, it would again pay each to
increase his price. And price increases until the
price charged is the monopoly price. Even small
search costs thus lead even a market with many
firms to charge monopoly prices. Work with Salop
(Salop and Stiglitz [1977, 1982, 1987], Stiglitz
[1979b, 1989c]), showed that in situations where
there were even small search costs, markets would
be characterized by a price distribution. If everyone
were charging the same price, it would pay some
firm either to raise his price, to exploit the high
search costs customers who he would not lose, or to
lower his price, to steal customers away from his
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rivals. The standard wisdom that said that not
everyone had to be informed to ensure that the mar-
ket acted in a perfectly competitive manner was
simply not in general true.86
EFFICIENCY OF THE MARKET
EQUILIBRIUM AND THE ROLE OF
THE STATE
Perhaps the most important single idea in eco-
nomics is that competitive economies lead, as if by
an invisible hand, to a (Pareto) efficient allocation
of resources, and that every Pareto efficient
resource allocation can be achieved through a com-
petitive mechanism, provided only that the appro-
priate lump sum redistributions are undertaken. It is
these fundamental theorems of welfare economics
which provide both the rationale for the reliance on
free markets, and the belief that issues of distribu-
tion can be separated from issues of efficiency,
allowing the economist the freedom to push for
reforms which increase efficiency, regardless of
their seeming impact on distribution; if society does
not like the distributional consequences. it should
simply redistribute income.
The economics of information showed that nei-
ther of these results was, in general, true. To be
sure, economists over the preceding three decades
had identified important market failures-such as
the externalities associated with pollution-which
required government intervention.87 But the scope
for market failures was limited, and thus the arenas
in which government intervention was required
were limited.
Early work, already referred to, had laid the
foundations for the idea that economies with infor-
mation imperfections would not be Pareto efficient,
even taking into account the costs of obtaining
information. There were interventions in the market
that could make all parties better off. We had
shown, for instance, that incentives for the disclo-
sure and acquisition of information were far from
perfect; imperfect appropriability meant that there
might be insufficient incentives, but the fact that
much of the gains were "rents," gains by some at
the expense of others, suggested that there might be
excessive expenditures on information. One of the
arguments for unfettered capital markets was that
there were strong incentives to gather information;
if one discovered that some stock was more valu-
able than others thought, and if you bought it before
they discovered the information, then you would
make a capital gain. This price discovery function
of capital markets was often advertised as one of its
strengths. But the issue was, while the individual
who discovered the information a nano-second
before any one else might be better off, was society
as a whole better off: if having the information a
nano-second earlier did not lead to a change in real
decisions (e.g. concerning investment), then it was
largely redistributive, with the gains of those
obtaining the information occurring at the expense
of others. Another example illustrates what is at
issue. Assume hundred dollar bills were to fall, one
each at the left foot of each student in my class.
They could wait to the end of the lecture, then pick
up the money; but that is not a Nash equilibrium. If
all students were to do that, it would pay any one to
bend down and quickly scoop up what he could.
Each realizing that immediately picks up the dollar
bill at his foot. The equilibrium leaves each no bet-
ter off than if he had waited-and there was a great
social cost, the interruption of the lecture.88
There are potentially other inefficiencies associ-
ated with information acquisition. Information can
have adverse effects on volatility.89 And information
can lead to the destruction of markets, in ways
which lead to adverse effects on welfare. We
described earlier how the existence of asymmetries
of information can destroy markets. Individuals
sometimes have incentives to obtain information
(creating an asymmetry of information), which then
leads to the destruction of insurance markets, and
an overall lowering of welfare. Welfare might be
increased if the acquisition of this kind of informa-
tion could be proscribed. Recently, such issues have
become sources of real policy concern, in the arena
of genetic testing. Even when information is avail-
able, there are issues concerning its use, with the
use of certain kinds of information having either a
discriminatory intent or effect, in circumstances in
which such direct discrimination itself would be
prohibited.9 0
Moreover, asymmetries of information were
shown to be related to absent or imperfect markets.
They help explain why the market for lemons, or
the credit or labor or equity markets worked imper-
fectly. The fact that markets with imperfect infor-
mation worked differently-and less well-than
markets with perfect information was not, by itself,
a damning criticism of markets. After all, informa-
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tion is costly, and taking into account the costs of
information, markets might be fully efficient.
Stigler had essentially argued for this perspective,
but without proof. Our research showed that this
assertion-or hope-was simply not correct. Earli-
er work had established that when markets are
absent or imperfect, market equilibrium might be
constrained Pareto inefficient, that is, taking into
account the absence of the market, everyone could
be made better off.9 ' Moreover, since asymmetries
of information give rise to market power, and per-
fect competition is required if markets are to be effi-
cient, it is perhaps not surprising that markets with
information asymmetries and other information
imperfections are far from efficient.
But while it was thus not surprising that markets
might not provide appropriate incentives for the
acquisition and dissemination of information, the
market failures associated with imperfect informa-
tion are far more profound. The intuition can be
seen most simply in the case of models with moral
hazard. There, the premium charged is associated
with the average risk, and, therefore, fthe average
care taken by seemingly similar individuals. The
moral hazard problem arises because the level of
care cannot be observed. Each individual ignores
the effect of his actions on the premium; but when
they all take less care, the premium increases. The
lack of care by each exerts a negative externality on
others.
The essential insight of Greenwald and Stiglitz
[1986192 was to recognize that such externality-like
effects are pervasive whenever information is
imperfect or markets incomplete-that is always-
and as a result, markets are essentially never con-
strained Pareto efficient. 93 In short, market failures
are pervasive.
There were two other implications. The first was
the non-decentralizability of efficient market solu-
tions. The notion that one could decentralize deci-
sion making to obtain (Pareto) efficient resource
allocation is one of the fundamental ideas in eco-
nomics. Greenwald and Stiglitz showed that that
was not in general possible. Again, a simple exam-
ple illustrates what is at issue. An insurance compa-
ny cannot monitor the extent of smoking, which has
an adverse effect on health. The government cannot
monitor smoking any better than the insurance
company, but it can impose taxes, not only on ciga-
rettes, but also on other commodities which are
complements to smoking (and subsidies on substi-
tutes which have less adverse effects.)94 Earlier
work with Bravernan [1982] had shown the conse-
quences of this non-decentralizability, the interlink-
age of land, labor, and credit markets in agrarian
markets of developing countries.
Markets are also interlinked over time. Intertem-
poral linkages impair the efficacy of competitive
processes, as we have already noted. Standard the-
ory stated that if an employer does not treat an
employee well, he simply moyes to another firm.
But informational asymmetries impair labor mobil-
ity, partially locking the employee into his employ-
er, or the borrower into his creditor.95 While with
perfect information and perfect markets, some of
the consequences of this reduction in ex post com-
petition could be corrected by the intensity of ex
ante competition, there is little reason to believe
that is in fact the case.96
One of the sources of the market failures is
agency problems, such as those which arise when
the owner of land is different from the person work-
ing the land. The extent of agency problems-and
therefore of market failures-thus depends on the
distribution of wealth, as we noted earlier in our
discussion of sharecropping. It is simply not the
case that one can separate out issues of equity and
efficiency.97
Moreover, the notion that one could separate out
issues of equity and efficiency also rested on the
ability to engage in lump sum redistributions. But
as Mirrlees [1971] had earlier pointed out, with
imperfect information, this was not possible; all
redistributive taxation was distortionary. But this
had important implications for a wider range of
policies beyond simply the design of tax structures.
It meant that interventions in the market which
changed the before tax distribution of income could
be desirable, because they lessened the burden on
redistributive taxation.9" Again, the conclusion: the
second welfare theorem, effectively asserting the
ability to separate issues of distribution and effi-
ciency, was not true.99
In effect, the Arrow Debreu model had identified
the single set of assumptions under which markets
were (Pareto) efficient. There had to be perfect
information, or, more accurately, i-nformation
(beliefs) could not be endogenous, they could not
change either as a result of the actions of any indi-
vidual or fimn, including investments in informa-
tion. But in an information economy, a model
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which assumes that information is fixed seems
increasingly irrelevant.
Dysfunctional institutions
As the theoretical case that markets in which
information was imperfect were not efficient
became increasingly clear, several arguments were
put forward against government intervention. One
we have already dealt with: the government too
faces informational imperfections. But our analysis
had shown that the incentives and constraints facing
government differed from those facing the private
sector, so that even when government faced exactly
the same informational constraints, welfare could
be improved upon."°
There was another argument, which held up no
better. The existence of market failures-absent or
imperfect markets-does give rise to non-market
institutions. The absence of death insurance gave
rise to burial societies. Families provide insurance
to their members against a host of risks for which
they either cannot buy insurance, or for which the
insurance premium is viewed to be too high. But in
what I call the functionalist fallacy, it is easy to go
from the observation that an institution arises to ful-
fill a function to the conclusion that actually, in
equilibrium, it serves that function. Those who suc-
cumbed to this fallacy seemed to argue that there
was no need for government intervention because
these nonmarket institutions would "solve" the
market failure, or at least do as well as any govern-
ment. Richard Arnott and I [199la] showed that, to
the contrary, non-market institutions could actually
make matters worse. Insurance provided by the
family could crowd out market insurance; insurance
companies would recognize that the insured would
take more risk because they had obtained insurance
from others, and accordingly cut back on the
amount of insurance that they offered. But since the
non-market (family) institutions did a poor job of
divesting risk, welfare was decreased."0 '
The Amott-Stiglitz analysis reemphasized the
basic point made at the end of the last subsection: it
was only under very special circumstances that
markets could be shown to be efficient. Why then
should we expect an equilibrium involving non-
market institutions and markets to be efficient?
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